economic theory predicts an aggregate saving lunction s(1) arediscusserf. The first is that the evolution of the co&x markets basic describing the composition of output at each moment so
ia western economies has realized an institutionalstructure through that one has which decentralized guidance of the economy can be implemented. The second is that with such market structures it may be possible to design J(t) = s(t)F(K(f)).
(3) ccMiomicpo'icies iHiichnaltteBiaiciaitcantraloftheeconomK~on (The oonnegativity constraints cited earlier imply that one without direct inlerimtion in the optimizing decisions of iodbiduml -.
, has the restriction 0 5 s 5 1, for all I.) relen,t wknical liienturc Amodtb of V,,+I,. Ho&wr, It is clear that this model, though crude, does describe a c n e w r e m i t s i i x l a n e~ Merrretatiaaofknonnresultsareprtitiilfl.
complete system, and it could be used to study some simple features of a process of capital accumulation and economic I. INTRODUCTION growth. Equations (1)-(3) thus constitute, for given func-F OR SOME PURPOSES of analysis-in particular, for tions F and s and given initial condition K(0) = KO, a our present expository purposes-an economy may be simple differential equation describing an economic system. viewed as a system in which the inputs are stocks of produc-From a given starting point the whole future of this model five assets or resources (a complete inventory of the economy is determined. Descriptive theories of economic machines, manpower. and material stocks available for growth study the consequences of various arbitrary rules production), and the outputs are flows, of goods and services for obtaining the function s and thus determining the for final consumption or for addition to the stocks of composition of output; stability properties of the solutions productive resources available for later use in creation of to the resulting differential equations have been ofparticular still furthef goods. To illustrate our discussion in concrete interest [lo] , [19] . Here, however, we wish to consider how terms, we first consider a particularly simple example of such saving rules might be derived from performance such a system-one in which there is only a single produced criteria reftecting considerations of social welfare. asset, called capital equipment, the stock of which at time 1 Imagine, for example, that a new central government is is denoted by K(t). The output of this system is divided elected for a term of T years on a platform which promises into two flows: a flow of goods intended for final consump-"to determine economic policy so as to realize the maximum tion and a flow of investment goods to be added to the attainable value of a social welfare criterion stock of capital equipment. Denoting these two flows by C(t) and / ( I ) , respectively. we recognize that physical J = jQT u(c(~)) exp ( -7 t ) dt considerations impose the constraints 1 2 0, C 2 0. We w also assume that technological relations (the "plant" for yjs a specified smooth concave positive function the economic system) may be summarized in the eq~dtions a nonnegative number, subject to the technological
(1) constraints cited in the foregoing, given an initial capital stock and the pledge that the terminal capital stock shall K = 1 -S K equal a prescribed value KT." Let us assume, since the which describe the stream of output F(K) attainable from voter* approved the proposal, that this criterion accurately the services of a given stock K of capital equipment and reflects the desires of the community. <The constant Y would prescribe that this output flow be either to then be called. in economic jargon, the social rate of time consumption C or to gross investment I. In turn, investment preference for the community. The weighting function exo (-11) would thus assign less significance to consump--~ . , --tion more distant in time. and the "utility function" U Manuscript received k b r l u r y 15, 1971, revised A u g W 13. 1971 bystem and turning to trajectories with changing prices and stocks, it is helpful to determine the locus of points on
-' K1' (5' which one or another of the variables is momentarilv
As is well known, the maximum principle asserts that a necessary condition for an admissible policy .?(I) to be optimal Is that there exist a continuous function @(I) satisfying
SK
and such that for fixed K and $, H is a maximum with respect to s satisfying 0 s <s 1. Because the functions F and U are both assumed concave, it can be proved that these necessary conditions are also sufficient conditions that a policy s be optimal (see Mangasarian [12] With this information, it is possible to construct a phase diagram for the system, and thus to illustrate what the value of p~ must be to ensure satisfaction of the pledge that the terminal capital satisfy K(T) = Kr-Hence we may characterize the accumulation path to be followed, observing in particular that the point (K*,p*) constitutes a saddle point equilibrium for the system. Since the analysis is
straightforward, we omit construction of such a phase P(T) = PT (8) diagram here.
It might happen that capital is initially so plentiful that where PT it to be chosen to ensure that K(T) = 4, and all output can be consumed, this case we must deal
explicitly with the boundary case Z = 0. The system equations under these circumstances become
We wish to analyze the nature of solutions to this system First, let us consider the possibility of an equilibrium state k = 0,p = 0 Such an equilibrium would require the following equations:
Thus, if there 1s to be any positive equilibrium solution, it can be only at a value K* such that with appropriate boundary conditions. One possible sequence of events, then, is that initially capital is so plentiful that all output may be consumed. In this situation capital decumulates, and the price for investment goods rises, ultimately to equal the marginal utility of consumption if all output is consumed. At this point the system switches into its interior mode with output divided between consumption and investment. Thereafter the system may continue to follow a path with rising price for investment and gradually slowing rate of capital decuinulation. (Of course. nothing we have said so far guarantees that only one
' The point (0,co) is also a possible equilibrium siatu for the sy>lcm For K = 0. p < co, one hasp = -m, and the nonnegativity conthat is, at a capital stock such that the rate of return (net of Mrainlii > 0 becomes binding, at which pnmt thedilTerenlul equation for p fails lo hold We, therefore, assume throughout the foilowing depreciation) is equal to the imposed rate of time preference that K > 0.
. BURMEISIER AND DOBELL: FRET-MARKET ECONOMI1.S fr such switch point will occur; this question has been studied in detail by Arrow [I] .)
The time required lo traverse the distance between fixed initial and terminal values KO, Kr can be shown to increase with the vertical distance of the trajectory from the fixed point (A'*,pR). near which the velocity of the system point is very low. In other words. we see that as the plan period becomes longer, the system tends to spend an increasing proportion of the period in the vicinity of the particular value K*. Further, one might conjecture that if the problem remains meaningful even as the plan period becomes infinitely long, then the economy wpuld tend asymptotically to this stationary point (K*,p*). This conjecture has been verified by various authors (e.g., Cass [5] . f6] and Samuelson [14] ) for models of the sort we have specified in the preceding.
This argument thus yields a fairly complete solution to the question of the optimal saving policy in this simple example. The technique of analysis illustrated here is typical of the procedures in standard analyses of optimal saving policy, such as those to which we have referred before.
Given the foregoing analysis, the task of a central planning agency with direct control over the economic system can be reduced to the following: 1) to select a value for pr which ensures adequate terminal capital; 2) to solve the two-point boundary value problem for the assigned value of pr; 3) to determine the associated policy I(?) or s(1) satisfying all the preceding necessary conditions; and 4) to dictate production plansand thecomposition ofoutput in accord with that optimal policy. The agency could also, of course, attempt to synthesize the resulting open-loop control to obtain a feedback control law I ( K ) displaying investment as a function of the capital stock at each instant. This saving policy could then be implemented by central control determining the composition of output at each instant. In the next section w$ consider an alternative to this procedure.
We now wish to show that existing market institutions may realize an optimal path in the preceding problem without appeal to an agency having any direct control over resource allocation. Further, we shall observe that the system resulting from such a market mechanism corresponds to a partially synthesized control. From this there follow certain interesting questions as t o the stability of the market-guided accumulation process.
Let us, therefore, imagine that the planning agency may participate in various market operations in an attempt to influence the development of the economy. In particular, we assume that whenever the flow of consunlption goods is at rate C, the agency stands ready to buy consumption goods at a quoted price U'(C). Suppose that actual production is carried out by numerous small independent firms who take the agency's posted price for consun~ption goods as fixed. Assume further that the agency stands ready to accept deposits of the consumption good, storing these for later repayment with interest at a rate equal to y. Assume finally that at each time I there exists a prevailing price p for a unit of capital equipment. Our first task is to discuss the determination of this price.
Econonlic theory teaches us that in a system of perfect capital markets the price of such a unit of capital equipment ought to reflect the present value of all future rentals earned by the unit and ought, therefore, to he given by an expression
where R(T) is the value of the incremental output produced by the marginal machine at time T, and pr is the unknown scrap value of the asset at the terminal time T. (The exponential decay factor reflects both time discount and physical deterioration.) Again, on economic grounds, given the prices U'(C) for consumption and p for investment goods, it may be argued that the imputed rental R(T) can be estimated by where the bracketed term can be recognized as simply a weighted average price. Differentiating the expression for p(f) with respect to 1 and substituting for R(I), we find the following:
Now what is the situation? The price equation given in the foregoing (excluding the terminal condition) is realized as a consequence of the operation of perfect capital markets, that is, as a result of trading by portfolio managers seeking the best investment options. The planning agency need play no role in these individual portfolio decisions and asset transfers. Further, the pursuit of maximum profit by independent producers will lead in principle (given the price quoted by the planning agency for consumption goods) to that composition of output a,t each instant which satisfies Ur(C(f)) = ~(1). (Ifthe equality cannot be realized, producers are led naturally to select the appropriate boundary case.) In other words, the pricing actions of the planning agency and the capital markets induce independent firms to act so as to maximize the Hamiltonian H, while the action of the agency in receiving deposits of the consumption good serves to peg the rate of return to assets in such a way as to force the asset price p determined on capital markets to agree with the auxiliary variable derived earlier (at least up to boundary conditions). If, further, the planning agency announces a terminal pricep-r at which it is prepared to acquire capital goods, the agreement of the perfect asset price p with the auxiliary variable p is complete. Thus, by posting a price for consumption goods at each instant, a terminal price for capital goods, and by accepting deposits at a prescribed rate of interest, the planning agency apparently can lead a free capital market into generating a price equal to the auxiliary variable p, which can then in turn act as a signal to independent producers such that they are led to produce the optimal outputs of investment and consumption goods.
We thus have the makings of a rather interesting theorem. adynamicversionof a well-known result in staticeconomics, namely, that an optimal policy for the problem posed initially can be attained by a competitive system (provided only that the planning agency develops the appropriate signals with respect to the consumption good, terminal asset values, and the appropriate rate of return on assets or rate of interest).
The introduction of additional sectors-or, for that matter, additional nonproduced nontradahle assets-would not add anything to this analysis except some further conditions necessary for maximization of the Hamiltonian H. But the introduction of distinct durable and tradable capital goods, on the other hand, would introduce problems not encountered in our one-sector model. We must still decide upon the extent of saving and investment, as before, but now we must also decide upon the composition of investment as between the different capital goods.
Roughly speaking, when there are many different Capital goods, the resolution of the optimal accumulation problem may be described as follows.
1) Specification of an optimal accumulation problem itself entails an implicit social rate of time discount implied by the criterion function, and optimal decisions may be expected to make the own-rate of return on the consumption good equal to this implied social rate of time discount, just as in the foregoing.
2) Given the own-rateof return on the consumption good pegged at the social rate of time preference, capital market trading realizes the dynamic efficiency conditions of Samuelson [IS]-the arbitrage conditions or auxiliary equations-so as to force all capital goods prices to change at a rate which makes the yield on each capital good equal to that on the consumption good. This determines the prices of all capital goods, assuming that initial values can be specified in accord with terminal requirements 3) Given the prices of all capital goods and the opportunity cost of diverting resources from consumption as indicated by the criterion function, the extent and cvmposition of investment are determined by the actions of producers in each of the productive sectors who act so as to maximize current profit. 4) Given the outputs of each sector, the accumulation of various assets is determined by accumulation equations similar to (2). so asset stocks are all determined once initial conditions are given. Hence we have prices and endowment levels determined at each instant iind the whole evolution of an optimal path established from initial conditions. This little scenario thus sketches a way in vihich optimal control of a system with distinct capital goods could be IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS. JANUARY 1972 realized. What we are arguing is that the requirements for an optimal path can be summarized as the following: 1) there must exist continuous asset prices such that the yield on all assets is equal, and their common value is the social rate of time discount implied by the criterion function; 2) the initial prices must be chosen to satisfy some transversatity condition; and 3) with asset prices and the endowment levels given at each instant, the composition of output must be selected so as to yield a maximum value to net national product.
We are now suggesting that a decentralized system may be expected to realm condition 3) through the actions of suppliers and to equalize asset yields through arbitrage. What remains for the planning agency is simply to assign initial asset prices so as to satisfy terminal or transversality conditions and to equate the common yield on assets with the social rate of time preference or otherwise establish an appropriate price for the consumption good. If proper representation of saving decisions and the market for funds were to bring asset yields into balance with time preference-as is theoretically the role of markets for funds, then only the assignment of initial asset prices would remain.
If, finally, future markets were able to look into the distant future and recognize the satisfaction of transversality conditions, or, more precisely, were able to recognize the eventual violation of one of the auxiliary equations as a result of failure to satisfy transversality conditions, then the assignment of initial prices would also be realized as required for optimal growth. (This issue is investigated most thoroughly by Shell and Stiglitz [18] .)
In a complete system of perfect markets, therefore, central economic control becomes unnecessary; every one of the conditions for optimal growth can be realized by a decentralized system of independent decision makers. Academician L. S. Pontryagin and his colleagues have thus enunciated a newer and more powerful principle of an invisible hand; the maximum principle of Pontryagin is seen to be the culmination of a logical sequence originating in the maximum principle of Adam Smith.
Of course, it goes without saying that the principle holds only for an ideal system of perfect markets; it applies equally to a decentralized socialist economy and a free market capitalist economy. It is a theorem about allocation mechanisms and not about income distribution. But is it not fascinating that the evolution of a free enterprise system has included development of some form (often quite imperfect) of each of the market structures required in principle to realize the theoretically optimal decentralized control system? (Moreover, it is aho clear that these remarks apply only to a community in which the value of output (gross national product) is the single measure of economic performance. Radner [I31 and Chakravarty [7] deal with the issue of optimal growth in multicapital models, and a great deal of further analysis is contained in [m].
A great many interesting issues flow from these considerations; we can sketch only a few here. Perhaps the 'essential point is that this decentralized system without central control is described by a different set of equations than the centralized system under optimal control. With fully synthesized control the operations of our model economic system can be described by
where s(K) is the optimal control obtained by integrating out the auxiliary variables and expressing the control as a function of the state alone. (The initial condition KO is impoted by nature.) Under the decentralized scheme outlined in the preceding, however, the operation of the system must be described by the equations
where s(p,K) is obtained from the condition
In other words, the decentralized system corresponds to one with incompletely synthesized control in which the auxiliary variables appear explicitly Because the original and auxiliary equations generally form a stable-unstahlc pair (it system with a saddle point equilibrium), and hcciiuse the terminal condition on the auxiliary variable is not imposed by nature, a number of stability questions arise We deal with these and other issues in the next sccnon.
by asset trading must be brought into balance with the social rate of time preference along an optimal path, and, in addition, initial prices must be assigned in conformity with terminal conditions. These latter two conditions are not naturally satisfied by a descriptive model of a market system. Whether a capitalist system has in principle a mechanism to meet these conditions and the consequences if it has not have been subjects for recent discussion Hahn [9] showed that in a model where no explicit intertemporal optimization is considered at all but where an arbitrary hypothesis determining total saving instead serves to determine the common own-rate of return at each instant and where transvenality conditions are not considered but initial asset prices are instead taken to be historically giventhen the system does not, in general, converge to a stable equilibrium, a so-called "balanced growth path." Rather, it diverges from the "balanced growth" equilibrium which is a saddle point in the pricequantity space. Hahn concluded that the presence of many capital goods was responsible for this result and apparently felt that the result itself cast doubt upon the desirability of a system of capitalist markets for guiding a compIex economy along an accumulation path. Shell and Stiglitz [IS] argued that the result was a consequence of incomplete specification, that full specification of an idealized capitalist system should include possible futures markets, and that if equilibrium in all of acomplete set of futures markets were required, then only the unique initial prices leading to balanced growth would be tenable as an initial price assignment in a competitive capitalist system.
Burmeister et a/. [4] suggested that the result of Hahn should be assessedin terms of its specification as to portfolio behavior, which requires asset holders to be prepared to accept the promise of capital gains (confidently expected) at an infinite rate as a perfect offset to an infinite gap between actual earning streams of two different assets. They showed that an alternative (still unrealistic) assumption concerning the determination of investment composition results in convergence of the system to a globally stable balanced growth path.
Still another very recent approach is based on [3, sec 9-5. pp 297-3061 I t has been proved that the manifold consisting of the backward solutions from stationdry equilibrium is generally of higher dimension i f all capital gums arc not havcil Accordingly, systems i n which consumption is sensitive to capital gainsincome may be "more *it.~ble,"a result that 15 not intuitively obvious The interested reader is referred to Burincister ~1 u/ [21] We do not propose to pursue these issues here, save to Hessian matrix is everywhere negative definite), joint observe that the results turn on the question of whether one production of the sort described docs exist. is dealin8 with a completely descriptive system taking initial Now consider the Euler-Lagrange equations for a asset prices as given, or with a planning model having some problem of the son analyzed earlier, assuming for simplicity mechanism for selecting initial balues for asset prices in that the constant ft is zero At a stationary point, where conformitj with terminal conditions Obviously, the f. 
and (18) (19) to the Euler-Lagrange equations need not be unique. a and thus if r > 0, (Pir may indeed change sign (When circumstance which raises doubts as to the significance of 7 = 0, of course, the restriction Gvf-< 0 implies <bi < 0 so-called turnpike theorems asserting characteristic features everywhere ) of optimal paths. However, these results have generally
It is interesting, however, that such a possibility exists been derived in models having a criterion (welfare) function only if there is joint production and G is a strictly concave in which not only consumption flows but also state variables function. To prove this assertion, we define the net own-rate such as wealth or capital stocks enter. It may be argued that of return on capital by r = C$JG, and note that (17) holds such models are objectionable on economic grounds in that if and only if r = y. But since it is known that dK/dt 1 k,n they "double-count" the benefits of additional stocks-< 0 in models without joint production, the proof is presumably increments to wealth or capital stock at a point immediate; we conclude (18) has a unique solution K* in time increase welfare only to the extent that they contri-under these circumstances. (See [2] and [3, ch. 91 ) hute to future consumption, the value of which is already Wherejointproductiondoesexist, however, thepossibility measured i n the criterion functional J, of two (or more) roots K* and K**, both satisfying (17) and Rather than pursue this issue directly, we shall retain our (I$), is definitely present The existence of multiple stationprevious criterion functional and show that the same non-ary solutions to the Euler-Lagrange equations also suggests uniqueness property may result under slightly different that the optimal policy may be altered drastically by the technological assumptions. More precisely, (I) of our earlier initial condition KO, with the optimal K ( t ) path arching model may be replaced by a production possibility frontier toward a lower root K* when KO is sufficiently low but in the form arching toward a higher root K** if KO is sufficiently high. C = G(I,K). 6 (A more detailed discussion of this issue is given in [3, pp. 41 1-4161, and a formal treatment can he found in [22] .) The function has a simple interpretation: at any fixed time ~~~t h~~ investigation of this subject may thus yield some I, K is fixed; given a nonnegative (admissible) value of gross insights into the adequacy of conclusions as to development investment 1, the value of G gives the maximum techno-policies and the efficiency of foreign aid derived from simple lo&a1l~ atbunable consumption flow C. Equalion (1) then aggregate models of the process of economic development. is seen to he written in a form which implicitly imposes the Numerical examples illustrating the extreme sensitivity of assumptions that a reduction in the flow 1 by one unit model results to parameter value changes when the preced.
in a corrcSPonding Increase in the flow G by exactly mgconditions ofnonuniqueness prevail also lead to question one unit. This strong assumption may be replaced by the whether such results are representativeof actual development weaker hypothesis that the flows C and i are outputs produced jointly by a single production process, in which case economists generally presume that G is a strictly C. Robust C0nlfoh concave function in 1 and K. S a n d s o n [I61 has proved Finally, we shall close this section with the observation that the singularity of the Hessian matrix of G is a neces-that the search for optimal policies becomes more difficult sary and sufficient condition for the absence of joint 35 more complex portfolio decision, investment decision, Thus, when G i s strictly concave (and its or saving decision rules are introduced and still more so as, one attemnts to take account of uncertainty. Eventually 'Siricily speaking, in making this observation we are implicitly the search will turn from a concern with exact optimality assumw the exisl~-nct of an underlying fixed labor force which is to a concern-with the identification of policies which lead to fully employed so lhal all the variables C , I, iind A: may be interpreted for our purpo-ics as per-capii;i ~u m i i i i i -,~ a nrodinriion -ibiliiv satisfactory values of the criterion function and which ate Irontier defined w~t h a variable labor f o r~c appc-iring c i p l~c~t l y ai an against i.~locks or mispccific.ltion, ~h~~ dreumcnl of the function G homogeneous of degree one in all its arguments is not strictly concave search can be expected to bring economists closer to the work of control engineers seeking policies which, while not attained through use of such powers can. therefore, not be precisely optimal, may have the property of inexorably considered to be fully decentralized. reducingsomeconvenient measure of distance from a target. Nevertheless, we find it somewhat remarkable that and to work of numerical analysts seeking "methods" market institutions evolving naturally through centuries of which yield "good" results for a whole class of problems, social development mirror as faithfully as they do the though not necessarily optimal results for any one problen~ conditions for optiinality in complex system. Decompasiin that class, or to work on the concept of fuzzy sets and lion algorithm'., dual programs, and auxilidry variables algorithms, which may permit approximate solution of were in everyday use in solving large-scale constrained approximately specified problems. maximization problem;! long before their theoretical foundations were erected. It seems safe to predict that V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS economic systems will prove to be a continuing source of A developed economy with elaborate goods and capital fascinating problems for the sophisticated control theorist. markets represents a very complex structure indeed. Within We hope these rough notes serve to identify a few questions the market framework individual producers and suppliers of this sort. of goods o r services contend with individual households allocating expenditures. Each agent represents a conscious
